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Abstract: Using classical combinatorial fault trees, analysts are able to assess the effects of combinations 
of failures on system behaviour but are unable to capture sequence dependent dynamic behaviour. 
Pandora introduces temporal gates and temporal laws to fault trees to allow sequence-dependent dynamic 
analysis of events. Pandora can be easily integrated in model-based design and analysis techniques; 
however, the combinatorial quantification techniques used to solve classical fault trees cannot be applied 
to temporal fault trees. Temporal fault trees capture state and therefore require a state space solution for 
quantification of probability. In this paper, we identify Petri Nets as a possible framework for quantifying 
temporal trees. We describe how Pandora fault trees can be mapped to Petri Nets for dynamic 
dependability analysis and demonstrate the process on a fault tolerant fuel distribution system model.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Our dependence on increasingly complex safety critical 
systems has made the dependability of such systems a prime 
concern for modern society. System safety and reliability are 
two key aspects of system dependability, and Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) is a well-established and widely used 
analysis method for evaluating these two properties. In FTA, 
analysis starts with a top event (system failure) and iteratively 
works backward to determine the root causes of system 
failure. To show logical connections between different faults 
and their causes, fault trees utilise a graphical representation 
based on Boolean logic (Vesely et al., 2002). Qualitative 
analysis is performed by reducing them to minimal cut sets 
(MCS), which are the smallest combinations of basic events 
(i.e., leaf nodes of the tree) that are necessary and sufficient 
to cause the top event. Quantitative analysis can estimate the 
unreliability of the system from probabilistic data about basic 
events, which typically represent component failures.   
In dynamic systems with mode and state changes, accurately 
capturing failure behaviour requires understanding the order 
in which events occur. Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) (Dugan, 
Bavuso and Boyd, 1992) and Pandora temporal fault trees 
(TFTs) (Walker, 2009) are two FTA extensions that capture 
dynamic behaviour. DFTs are typically used as a quantitative 
method and are analysed via conversion into Markov chains. 
Pandora introduces temporal gates and provides a set of 
temporal laws to allow both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis by generating minimal cut sequences (MCSQs) from 
TFTs. Similar to the MCSs of classical fault trees; the 
MCSQs of TFTs are the smallest sequences of events that are 
necessary and sufficient to cause the top event. However, the 
techniques used for solving classical FTs are not suitable to 
solve Pandora TFTs. The solution requires generating all 
possible reachable system states and stochastic transitions 
between states. In other words, a conversion to a Continuous 
Time Markov Chain (CTMC) is required to solve TFTs. As 
stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) are a well-established modelling 
technique and their underlying reachability graphs are 
isomorphic to CTMCs, they have been used for state-space 
solution to DFTs (Codetta-Raiteri, 2005; Zhang, Miao, Fan 
and Wang, 2009). However, no attempts have been made so 
far to use stochastic Petri Nets to solve Pandora TFTs.  
One of the advantages of Pandora is that it can do qualitative 
analysis and create useful insight to system failure in the 
absence of limited or absent quantitative failure data, e.g. in 
the case of new software components. In addition, the 
technique is integrated well in model-based design and 
analysis. It has been shown by Walker and Papadopoulos  
(2009) that Pandora logical expressions can be used to 
describe the local failure behaviour of components and then 
enable synthesis of TFTs from systems models that have 
been annotated with Pandora expressions using popular 
notations, e.g. Matlab Simulink, SysML, EAST-ADL, or 
AADL. Given the increasing importance of model-based 
design and analysis, and the potential use of Pandora in this 
context, we believe that it is both theoretically and practically 
useful to explore possible ways for improved analysis of 
Pandora TFTs. Therefore, in this paper, we show how the 
Petri Nets can also be used to solve Pandora TFTs. 
2. PANDORA TEMPORAL FAULT TREES 
Pandora defines three temporal gates: Priority-AND (PAND), 
Priority-OR (POR), and Simultaneous-AND (SAND) to 
extend classical fault trees. These gates allow analysts to 
represent sequences or simultaneous occurrence of events, 
and thus enable fault trees to capture sequence dependent 
dynamic behaviour as well as combinatorial failure 
  
     
 
behaviour. Fault tree symbols for the three gates are shown in 
Fig.1, where (I) is the Priority-AND, (II) is the Priority-OR, 
and (III) is the Simultaneous-AND. 
 
PAND gate is not a new gate and has been used in FTA as far 
back as the 1970s (Fussell, Aber and Rahl, 1976), and also 
used in the Dynamic Fault Trees. However, behaviour of this 
gate was never properly defined for use in qualitative 
analysis, resulting in ambiguous outcome. The symbol ‘<’ is 
used to represent the PAND gate in logical expressions, i.e., 
A < B means (A PAND Y) where A and B are both failure 
events. In Pandora, therefore, the PAND gate is defined as 
being true only if: 
 
1. All input events occur 
2. Input events occur in sequence from left to right 
3. No input events occur simultaneously 
 
 
Fig. 1. Temporal gates: (I) PAND. (II) POR. (III) SAND. 
Like the PAND gate, the POR gate also defines a sequence, 
but it specifies an ordered disjunction rather than an ordered 
conjunction. It is used to indicate that one input event has 
priority and must occur first for the POR to be true, but does 
not require all other input events to occur as well. The POR 
can therefore be used to represent trigger conditions where 
the occurrence of the priority event means that subsequent 
events may have no effect. The symbol ‘|’ is used to represent 
the POR gate in logical expressions, thus A|B means (A POR 
Y). The POR is true only if the following conditions are true: 
 
1. Its left-most (priority) occurs 
2. No other input event occurs before the priority event 
3. No other input event occurs at the same time as the 
priority event 
 
The SAND gate is used to define situations where an 
outcome is only triggered if two or more events occur 
approximately simultaneously. For example, this can happen 
because of a common cause, or because the events have a 
different effect if they occur approximately simultaneously as 
opposed to in a sequence. It is true only if: 
 
1. All input events occur 
2. All the input events occur at the same time 
 
The symbol ‘&’ is used to represent the SAND gate in logical 
expressions. In this paper, we use ‘+’ to represent OR and ‘.’ 
to represent AND gate. In a logical expression the SAND 
gate has the highest priority, then PAND, POR, AND, and 
OR. Hence A+B&C<D|E is equivalent to A+(((B&C)<D)|E). 
 
Pandora extends fault trees with temporal gates and provides 
a set of temporal laws to facilitate qualitative analysis. These 
laws form the basis for qualitative analysis of Pandora’s 
temporal fault trees and they can all be proved with the help 
of temporal truth tables as in (Walker, 2009). Temporal laws 
help to reduce and minimise the failure expressions to obtain 
minimal cut sequences (MCSQs). From the MCSQs, it is 
possible to understand what combinations and sequences of 
events are necessary and sufficient to cause system failure.  
Pandora considers occurrence of failure events as instant (i.e., 
go from ‘false’ to ‘true’ with no delay) and persistent (i.e., 
once occurred, they remain in a ‘true’ state forever). 
 
Although the primary goal of creating Pandora TFTs was to 
facilitate qualitative analysis, efforts have also been made to 
enable quantitative analysis. Methodologies for probabilistic 
evaluation of Boolean gates are available in the Fault Tree 
Handbook (Vesely et al., 2002). Similarly, as the PAND gate 
also features in DFTs, algebraic (Fussell, Aber and Rahl, 
1976; Merle, Roussel and Lesage, 2011), Markov chain based 
(Boudali, Crouzen and Stoelinga, 2007), Bayesian Network 
based (Boudali and Dugan, 2005; Neil et al., 2008; Montani, 
Portinale, Bobbio and Codetta-Raiteri, 2008), and Petri Net 
based (Codetta-Raiteri, 2005) methods are all available for 
quantifying the PAND gate in DFTs. Recently, analytical 
approaches have been introduced by Edifor, Walker and 
Gordon (2012, 2013) and a Bayesian Network based 
approach has been proposed by Kabir, Walker and 
Papadopoulos (2014) to quantify Pandora temporal fault 
trees. However, this latter approach models the failure 
behaviour of the system in a discrete-time domain, and 
therefore requires settling the granularity of time 
discretisation as part of the model transformation.  
 
3. PRELIMINARIES ON PETRI NETS 
Petri Nets are a formal graphical and mathematical modelling 
tool widely used with distributed and concurrent systems. 
Classical Petri Nets consist of a finite set of places, a finite 
set of transitions, and a finite set of directed arcs (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. A simple Petri Net 
Places are graphically represented by circles and may contain 
tokens, while transitions are graphically represented by 
rectangles and are set to fire when a certain pre-specified 
number of tokens are available in the places connected to the 
transitions. Directed arcs connect places to transitions and 
vice versa. Traditional Petri Nets allow determination of the 
qualitative properties of systems; if they are extended with 
temporal data then quantitative and time-dependent analysis 
can also be performed. Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) (Molloy, 
  
     
 
1982) are an extension of classical Petri Nets where all 
transition delays are exponentially distributed. In SPNs, 
immediate transitions are difficult to model. Generalised 
Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs) (Marsan et al., 1996) solve 
this by allowing both immediate and timed transitions. Timed 
transitions fire after a random period of time (defined as 
exponential distribution of firing time) and immediate 
transitions fire as soon as they are enabled. Immediate 
transitions have priority over timed transitions, i.e., if a timed 
and an immediate transition are enabled at the same time, and 
if any conflict exists between them, then the immediate 
transition fires first. In this paper, timed transitions are 
represented as white rectangles and immediate transitions are 
represented as black rectangles. A special type of arc known 
as an inhibitor arc that ends with a small circle instead of an 
arrowhead is used to connect a place to a transition in order 
to disable the transition if the place is not empty. This allows 
checking the non-occurrence of events. 
Petri Nets can be used to model both nominal and failure 
behaviour of systems. In some cases, Petri Nets are used to 
model functional behaviour and then another safety analysis 
method e.g., FTA is used to analyse failure behaviour of the 
systems based on the non-functional behaviour identified 
from the Petri Nets. In order to increase the modelling and 
analytical capability of combinatorial approaches to 
dependability analysis, Bobbio, et al (1999) and Helmer et al. 
(2007) have proposed ways of translating fault trees into PNs. 
Codetta-Raiteri (2005) and Zhang et al (2009) have 
introduced ways of mapping DFTs to PNs. 
 
4. BEHAVIOURAL SPECIFICATION OF TFT GATES 
WITH PETRI NETS   
This section defines a method for translating Pandora 
temporal fault trees into generalised stochastic Petri Nets. In 
Pandora TFT, events are considered as non-repairable, i.e., 
once a component fails it stays in the failure state forever, 
and gates propagate faults instantly. In the proposed 
mapping, each TFT node (basic, intermediate, and top events) 
is mapped to a sub-net where there is a place indicating the 
status of the node. We use places to represent the state of the 
system, timed transitions to represent random faults and 
immediate transitions to represent failure propagation. Timed 
transitions are characterised by the failure rate of basic events 
and here we have used exponential distribution of failure 
rates. The mapping of each TFT gate to GSPN should be 
correct in that there is a place in the sub-net representing the 
outcome of the gate and if all the conditions are fulfilled for 
the transition representing a gate to fire then the place gets a 
token. 
4.1  Basic Events 
The mapping of a basic event to a Petri Net is shown in Fig.3. 
As all components are assumed to be fully functional at time 
0, the place representing the working state has a token. Every 
component has a failure rate, and the occurrence of an event 
(component failure) is represented by the timed transition 
named Fail. Once this transition fires, the event occurs and a 
token is consumed from the place Working and a token is 
deposited to the place Failed which represents a failure state 
of a component. After that the failure is propagated instantly 
through the immediate transition named Propagate. The 
outgoing arrow from transition Propagate back to place 
Failed serves to maintain persistency of events, i.e., maintain 
the permanent failure state of the event irrespective of any 
further propagation. To ensure that the error is propagated 
exactly once in a single path, the inhibitor arc from place 
Propagated to transition Propagate is used.  
 
Fig. 3. Mapping of a basic event to a Petri Net 
4.2  Temporal Fault Tree Gates 
Mapping of Boolean AND and OR gates to a Petri Net is 
done based on the work of  Bobbio et al. (1999) and shown in 
Fig.4 and 5 respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Mapping of a two input AND gate to a Petri Net 
 
Fig. 5. Mapping of a two input OR gate to a Petri Net 
All the places corresponding to the input events (X_Failed, 
Y_Failed) of the AND gate are connected to a single 
immediate transition with bidirectional arrows. The transition 
will fire when all the input places have tokens (i.e., all input 
events occur) and on firing it deposits a token to the place 
representing the outcome of the gate (AND_Propagated). The 
OR gate is translated to PN by creating a transition for each 
place corresponding to input events of the gate. When one of 
the input places gets a token, one of the transitions will fire 
and deposit a token to the place corresponding to the outcome 
of the OR gate (OR_Propagated). In both the cases (AND 
and OR) no token is consumed from the input places because 
an event may be the input of several gates (hence the bi-
directional arrows). If there are more inputs either to the 
AND or the OR gate then we just need to include them 
following the same fashion shown in Fig. 4 and 5.  
  
     
 
Boolean gates are stateless in a sense that they do not need to 
remember the order of occurrence of the events. However, 
temporal gates must remember the order of occurrence of 
input events. The transformation of a two input PAND gate is 
shown in Fig. 6. If there is a token in X_Failed and no token 
in Y_Failed then the transition Propagate_X will fire and 
deposit a token to X_NOT_Y , i.e., event X has happened but 
Y has not happened yet. Afterwards, if Y_Failed gets a token 
due to the occurrence of event Y then this in conjunction with 
X_NOT_Y will enable the transition named PAND to fire, and 
thus deposit a token to the place corresponding to the 
outcome of the PAND gate (PAND_Propagated). A PAND 
gate with more input can be mapped to a Petri Net by 
following this technique whilst maintaining the strict 
sequencing of events. 
 
Fig.7 shows the mapping of a two input POR gate to a Petri 
Net. There is a priority event in the POR gate and the logic of 
the POR gate dictates that  to make the POR output true only 
the priority event is required to occur, or if other events also 
occur then they should occur after the priority event. In the 
POR gate of Fig.7, event X_failed has priority over event 
Y_Failed. The place POR_Propagated represents the 
scenario when the priority input event occurs first and if any 
other input occur then they occur after the priority event. In 
case of more than two inputs we have to make sure that either 
none of the non-priority input occurs or disjunction of all the 
non-priority events occurs after the priority event to make the 
POR outcome true. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Mapping of a two input PAND gate to a Petri Net 
 
 
Fig. 7. Mapping of a two input POR gate to a Petri Net 
As we use the exponential firing rates (failure rates) for the 
timed transitions, two transitions firing at the same time is 
zero. For this reason, if we transform the SAND gate 
containing two or more basic events into a Petri Net then 
during the whole mission time we will not get any token in 
the place representing the SAND output, i.e., probability of 
the SAND outcome is always 0. For this reason, during 
quantitative analysis using exponential failure rates we can 
ignore any MCSQ that contains a SAND gate and no need to 
transform a SAND gate to PN. The logical correctness of all 
the mappings of TFT gates to Petri Nets was verified by 
testing this scheme in the CPN tool (Jensen, Kristensen and 
Wells, 2007).   
5.  CASE STUDY AND EVALUATION 
We have applied the proposed approach to a case study of a 
simplified fault tolerant fuel distribution system of a ship, 
originally used in (Edifor, Walker and Gordon, 2012), 
reworked and shown in Fig. 9. In the functional mode of the 
system, there are two primary fuel flows: Tank 1 provides 
fuel to Engine 1 through Pump 1 (P1), and Tank 2 provides 
fuel to Engine 2 through Pump 2 (P2). Flowmeter 1 (F1) and 
Flowmeter 2 (F2) observe the rate of fuel flow to Engine 1 
and Engine 2 respectively and provide observed information 
to the controller. On detecting discrepancy in the fuel flow to 
either engine, the Controller introduces dynamic behaviour to 
this system to handle the situation by activating the standby 
Pump 3 (P3), redirecting fuel flow accordingly by opening 
some of the valves from V1-V4. 
 
For example, if inadequate fuel flow to Engine 1 is detected, 
then the Controller can open Valve 1 and 3 (V1 and V3) and 
activate Pump 3 (replacing Pump 1), and thus facilitate fuel 
flows to Engine 1 through Pump 3 instead of Pump 1. In 
contrast, if insufficient fuel flow to Engine 2 is detected then 
Pump 3 will be activated and Valve 2 and 4 will be opened 
instead of Valve 1 and 3. Hence, Pump 3 can replace either 
Pump 1 or Pump 2, but not both. A failure of Pump 1 and 
Pump 2 will result in no fuel flow to at least one engine; e.g., 
if Pump 2 fails and Pump 3 replaces it, then Pump 3 will be 
unavailable for replacing Pump 1 if the latter fails. This 
results in degraded propulsion functionality for the ship and 
with one engine working only the speed and manoeuvrability 
of the ship will be reduced. 
 
Pandora temporal gates can be used to capture the dynamic 
behaviour of the fuel distribution system and correctly 
capture the sequence of events together with the 
combinations of the events that can cause system failure. For 
simplicity, the internal failure of the engines themselves is 
left out of the scope of the analysis. The minimal cut 
sequences for the failure behaviour of Engine 1 of the fault 
tolerant fuel distribution system was obtained via model-
based synthesis from Pandora descriptions of local failure 
logic of components, and the minimal cut sequences are: 
 
  E1 = (P1|P2).P3 + (P1|P2).V1 +(P1|P2).V3  
    + (S1<P1)|P2 + (S1&P1)|P2 + P1&P2 
    + (CF<P1)|P2 + (CF&P1)|P2 + P2<P1 
  
 
Fig. 8. Fault Tolerant fuel Distribution System 
 
  
     
 
The basic events in the MCSQs are: 
 
1. P1/P2/P3 =  Failure of Pump 1/2/3 
2. V1/V3  =  Failure of Valve 1/3 
3. S1  =  Failure of Flowmeter 1 
4. CF  =  Failure of Controller 
 
As failure of Engine 1 and Engine 2 are caused by the same 
events in the opposite sequence, the analysis of failure 
behavior of Engine 2 is omitted for brevity. In the continuous 
time domain, the probability of two exponentially distributed 
independent events occurring exactly at the same time is 
effectively 0, therefore probability of the MCSQs containing 
SAND gate (S1&P1|P2, CF&P1|P2, and P1&P2) are 
considered as 0, and thus the equivalent Petri Net models for 
those MCSQs are not created. Note that this assumption may 
not always be true, e.g., in cases where a sizable mass of 
probability may exist for simultaneity. The equivalent Petri 
Net model for all other MCSQ are created following the 
procedure described in Section 4 and the Petri Net model for 
the failure behaviour of Engine 1 is obtained by combining 
the Petri Net model of all MCSQ, and shown in Fig. 9. In this 
figure, timed transitions (white rectangles) are characterised 
by exponential firing rates based on the failure rate of the 
components they are connected with. All the components are 
thought to have a constant failure rate per hour with 
probability of occurrence following an exponential 
distribution and the values are shown in Table 1. 
 
The system unreliability was calculated for mission times 
ranging from 2000 hours to 20000 hours using the ORIS tool  
(Horváth et al, 2012). The system unreliability for different 
mission times is shown in Table 2. For comparison, 
considering mission time as 10000 hours, the Bayesian 
Network based technique (Kabir, Walker and Papadopoulos, 
2014) for quantifying the TFT yields the unreliability of the 
system as 0.1159 and 0.1187 with 4 and 5 time slots 
respectively. For mission time as 10000 hours, the 
unreliability value obtained by the Petri Net based technique 
proposed in this paper is 0.1170 and it is quite close to the 
above mentioned values. 
 
Table 1. Failure rates of components of fault tolerant fuel 
distribution system 
Component Failure rate/hour (λ) 
Valve 1 1.0E-5 
Valve 3 6.0E-6 
Pump1 & Pump2 & Pump3 3.2E-5 
Flowmeter 2.5E-6 
Controller 5.0E-7 
 
Table 2. Unreliability of fuel distribution system 
Mission Time (Hours) Unreliability 
2000 0.007 
4000 0.024 
6000 0.050 
8000 0.081 
10000 0.117 
12000 0.155 
14000 0.195 
16000 0.235 
18000 0.275 
20000 0.315 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Petri Net model of the failure behaviour of the fuel distribution system
  
     
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have described how Pandora TFTs can be 
used to perform dynamic dependability analysis. Pandora is 
easily integrated in popular model-based design and analysis 
techniques, but classical combinatorial FTA approaches 
cannot be used for the quantitative analysis of Pandora. In 
this paper we show how Petri Nets provide a state space 
solution to Pandora TFTs and presented a method for 
transforming TFTs to Petri Nets for the purpose of dynamic 
dependability analysis. After creating a Petri Net for an 
example fuel system, the system unreliability was calculated 
for different mission times. One difficulty we foresee is that 
state space analysis could be computationally expensive since 
the number of states increases exponentially with the number 
of components of the system. Therefore, instead of analysing 
the whole TFT using state-based techniques, in the future we 
plan to use modularisation techniques that will enable us to 
use combinatorial solutions for modules with Boolean gates 
and state space solutions for modules with temporal gates.   
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